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I. INTRODUCTION
Organized labor has traditionally supported United States
reciprocal trade policies and the expansion of world trade. Particu-
larly since the end of World War II, the American labor movement
as a whole has supported the view that international commerce
should be as free as possible. This view is based on organized labor's
goals of increasing employment and improving living standards
both in the United States and abroad.
Organized labor particularly supported the United States Gov-
ernment's efforts to reduce tariffs during the Kennedy Round of
tariff negotiations in the 1960's. Since that time, however, labor
has increasingly come to realize that the old categories of "free
trade" and "protectionism" are obsolete. Those who believe in ex-
pansion of trade with other nations are no longer labelled as "free
traders" when they believe that such an expansion should be ac-
complished in a fair and orderly manner. The old concepts have
become outdated in the new world of managed national econo-
mies, state-owned enterprises and multinational conglomerates. In
light of these structural changes in the national and international
economies, organized labor currently believes that free trade
must be fair trade so that all segments of society may gain from
the benefits resulting from expanded commerce in an open trad-
ing system.
The structure of the global economy and world trade has changed
since the ideal laissez-faire model of trade was first constructed.
The growth of non-tariff barriers is not accounted for by the
laissez-faire model. In addition, the players themselves have
changed in that state-owned or subsidized enterprises now figure
prominently in former laissez-faire economies. Indeed, even the
procedures have changed. Different rules are applied to different
countries depending on whether they have market economies,
non-market economies or developing economies; or according to
the nature of their business enterprises- statal or para-statal,
multinational or domestic. Thus, both the players and the strat-
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egies involved in international trade have changed, making the old
rules obsolete.
It is within the context of these new realities that organized
labor has directed its policy toward the Tokyo Round of multilat-
eral trade negotiations (MTN), carried on under the auspices of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).1 Through-
out the negotiations, labor has tried to emphasize to the United
States negotiators the altered reality of international trade since
the GATT was formulated in 1947. Some recognition of the new
structure can be seen in the fact that this round of talks primarily
concentrated not on tariff-cutting, as had all previous rounds since
1934, but on other barriers to trade that have been built up over
the years, the so-called "non-tariff barriers" (NTBs).
Through the advisory committee process established by section
135 of the Trade Act of 1974,2 utilizing the Labor Policy Advisory
Committee (LPAC) and the Labor Sector Advisory Committees
(LSACs) among other means, labor has attempted to influence the
negotiating process, and at the same time, educate labor leaders,
themselves, on the issues involved in the negotiations. This ad-
visory process will continue as Congress considers the MTN
package in the Spring of 1979.
The international trade agreements arising out of the Tokyo
Round, which will be ratified by Congress along with domestic im-
plementing legislation, recognize to some extent labor's concerns
about the altered nature of international trade. For the most part,
however, the labor unions believe initially that these agreements
do not go far enough to (1) ensure that, in the words of President
Carter's 1978 State of the Union address, "free trade [is] also fair
trade,"8 and (2) ensure that all the players are playing by the same
rules. In addition organized labor feels that the agreements by no
means address the full scope of structural changes in international
trade. For example, organized labor supports certain regulation of
multinational corporations, revision of laws relating to taxation
and financing of these corporations and revision of certain cus-
toms laws, none of which are addressed by the Tokyo Round agree-
ments. Nor do the agreements address the question of goods pro-
duced under substandard working conditions, goods which labor
believes should not be allowed to freely compete with domestic
See Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, at 153 supra.
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 135, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975).
President Carter's 1978 State of the Union Address, H.R. DOC. NO. 95-273, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1978).
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goods and thereby undermine United States employment and
labor standards.
Therefore, the Tokyo Round agreements are viewed by labor as
only the first faltering steps toward a hoped-for new regime in in-
ternational trade which would embody the concept of fair trade as
its underlying principle. The discussion that follows addresses the
major Tokyo Round agreements and assesses how far, in the eyes
of labor, these agreements go toward meeting this goal.
II. THE CURRENT TOKYO ROUND AGREEMENTS
A. The Subsidies Code
Perhaps the most important of the international agreements,
from the perspective of organized labor, is the arrangement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties (Subsidies Code).' The Sub-
sidies Code attempts to limit trade distorting government sub-
sidies given to domestic industries in order to promote exports by
those industries. The code further recognizes that domestic sub-
sidies, i.e., subsidies which on their face do not have an export
promotion purpose, may also have trade distorting effects. Some
trade inhibiting subsidy practices have been indicated on an infor-
mal GATT list of examples. However, while the list of prohibitive
practices has been updated and expanded, it does not include all
forms of subsidization; for instance, the practice of rebating value-
added tax is not included. The agreement does, on the other hand,
eliminate the present requirement that the subsidy, in order to be
actionable, must result in a lower price abroad than in the home
market (dual pricing).
To a certain degree the code provides for special and differen-
tial treatment regarding the use of export subsidies by the lesser
developed countries. Labor would prefer that LDCs be required
to adhere to the same export subsidy standards as those demand-
ed of the developed nations. However, as the code stands, a
developed country must act to reduce or eliminate subsidies, or
else run the risk of having countervailing duties imposed against
it; while a lesser developed country is required only to promise or
pledge to reduce or eliminate countervailing duties (not to act af-
firmatively to eliminate them) in order to escape the threat of
countervailing duties.6 If, however, an LDC signatory does not
' See Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, at 153 supra.
' Robert S. Strauss Memorandum, (Dec. 27, 1978), Outline on Subsidies and Countervail-
ing Duties, Part V (Developing Countries).
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honor its pledge to phase out export subsidies in competitive sec-
tors, the United States may take countervailing action without
regard to injury. It should be noted that non-signatory countries
can have United States countervailing duties imposed on their
subsidized products without an injury test regardless of LDCIDC
status.
Adoption of the code would necessitate a change in the United
States countervailing duty statute to incorporate an injury test.
The code requires a broad test of "material injury." In the imple-
menting legislation, however, it is anticipated that the subsidy in-
jury text will be merged with the very weak antidumping injury
test adopted in Section 321 of the Trade Act of 1974.6 Accordingly,
domestic industries will be protected against threatened as well
as actual injury, and domestic industries which are trying to
become established will also be protected from retardation of
growth due to foreign subsidy practices.
The code contains a flexible definition of the industry which
may be deemed to be injured by foreign subsidy practices. For ex-
ample, domestic producers who also import may be excluded from
the universe of domestic producers who must show injury from
the subsidy. Under certain circumstances, producers within a
regional market may be considered to be a separate industry for
purposes of ascertaining injury.
Along with this broad definition of industry, the Subsidies Code
provides for a fast-track procedure whereby a deposit or bond for
possible countervailing duties may be required for up to four
months during an investigation where delay would result in injury
to a domestic industry. In critical circumstances a countervailing
duty may also be imposed on imports entered up to ninety days
before the application of provisional duties.
These provisions are deemed by labor to be improvements over
the present GATT subsidy procedures. Even the forced incorpor-
ation of an injury test into United States countervailing duty law
is not necessarily seen as undesirable by all segments of organized
labor, particularly those who reason that the Treasury Depart-
ment failed to enforce the prior legislation adequately even with
no test of injury. However, official AFL-CIO policy supports the
strengthening of domestic countervailing duty and antidumping
laws and does not favor the imposition of an injury test on the
ground that subsidies are an unfair practice which should be ac-
' Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 321, 88 Stat. 1987 (1975).
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tionable per se. Nevertheless, if an injury test is to be included in
United States law, it should be an easily proven one which recog-
nizes a need for growth and expansion of domestic industry.
B. The Safeguards Code
Also important in terms of reducing distortions to international
trade is the proposed Safeguards Code.7 This code, if agreed to,'
will supplement the provisions of GATT Article XIX, 9 under
which a country may restrict imports if a product is being im-
ported in such increased quantities and under such conditions as
to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers of a like
or directly competitive product.
While under the present GATT a country taking action is re-
quired to prove injury and consult with other affected countries,
the required procedures have not been followed in all cases. For
example, many countries restrict imports for safeguard purposes
without invoking Article XIX.1° Certain E.E.C. countries have per-
mitted private industries to negotiate voluntary export restraint
agreements with their counterparts in Japan. The details of these
private agreements have not been made public, but they may
result in diversion of Japanese exports from Western Europe to
the United States.
The draft Safeguards Code addresses some export discipline
restraints and requires transparent procedures for public hear-
ings and examination of the evidence when a safeguard measure is
contemplated. This should result in more openness and "due proc-
ess" in the practices of other countries than existed prior to the
code.
Despite the proposed code's benefits, organized labor groups
consider it deficient in certain areas. In the first place, the code's
definition of an affected industry is too narrow. For example, no
language in the draft code refers to injury to producers of parts or
components. An additional concern for labor under the draft
agreement is the special treatment to be accorded to LDCs. The
developed countries pledged (in the draft code) to avoid safeguard
actions on items of special interest to LDCs, but received no cor-
See Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, at 153 supra.
Negotiations have not been completed on this code. It will not be submitted with the
Administration package in the Spring of 1979. If agreement is forthcoming, a later submis-
sion date is contemplated.
* The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article XIX, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
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relative guarantee from the LDCs. While there will be provisions
for the lesser developed countries to "graduate" from this favored
status, labor would prefer that the criteria for graduation in this
and in other codes be spelled out, either in the code itself or in the
United States implementing legislation.
C. The Standards Code
Just as there is fear that under the Subsidies Code present
levels of protection of domestic industry could be eroded, so is
there fear that United States industrial standards could be reduced
by adoption of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(Standards Code).11 The Standards Code would attempt to reduce
distortions of trade arising from product standards, product test-
ing and product certification procedures which unnecessarily
restrict trade.
Under the Standards Code, governments may complain to a
committee of code signatories of certain product standards im-
posed by other signatories. This complaint process may ultimately
lead to modification of the trade restricting standard or authoriza-
tion of retaliatory action. However, as labor points out, neither
the enforcement powers of the panel set up to supervise the pro-
cedure under the code nor the criteria by which the panel would
determine violations are clear. Organized labor is especially con-
cerned that the Standards Code may lead to an undermining of
hard-won American standards, particularly occupational safety
and health standards, and state and local building codes. Although
the Standards Code contains, at several points, exemptions for
standards "necessary for the protection of human health or
safety,"" the labor movement will insist that United States appli-
cation of the code respect present domestic standards, even
though they may incidentally restrict international trade.
One final problem that labor sees in the Standards Code is the
absence of time limits for the resolution of complaints. This sug-
gests to labor that any final remedy would probably come too late
to help United States industries harmed by foreign standards pro-
visions.
D. The Government Procurement Code
The Government Procurement Code18 is designed to prevent
" See Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, at 153 supra.
II Strauss Memorandum, supra note 3, Proposed Draft GATT Code of Conduct for Pre-
venting Technical Barriers to Trade § 2.2, 2.6.
" See Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, at 153 supra.
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discrimination against foreign suppliers in the public procurement
process. In the United States, for instance, this code would do
away with the Buy American Act" for all covered entities and its
six per cent (or twelve per cent for small businesses or high unem-
ployment areas) price margin in favor of domestic bidders on
government contracts.
Some unions believe that the opening of opportunities for
United States companies to bid on foreign procurement contracts
as well as the creation of more open procurement systems in other
countries should be to our advantage. However, the AFL-CIO
points out that because of small business inexperience in foreign
trade and the absence of institutions to help small businesses bid
on foreign contracts, the only United States companies likely to
benefit from foreign procurement contracts will be the largest
companies.
Another problem perceived by labor arises from the fact that
the Procurement Code contains no strict rule of origin, even
though only those countries which are signatories to this par-
ticular code will be covered by its provisions. Without a tight rule
of origin in the code or in the domestic implementing legislation, a
foreign company, after winning a bid, could supply a product
which in reality had been manufactured (for the most part) in a
non-signatory country. A rule should be added that would require
that a designated percentage of a product originate in a signatory
country in order for it to be considered a true product of that par-
ticular country; moreover, the rule should provide a mechanism
for "tracing" a product to the true country or origin. In addition,
organized labor advocates a formal two-track system for United
States procurement under the new code. One system would be for
bidders from signatory countries and another much more rigid
system would be for non-signatory countries. This would induce
wider adherence to the code.
It should be noted that in response to labor's concerns, United
States negotiators excluded import-sensitive products such as tex-
tiles and apparel, hand tools and stainless steel flatware from
coverage by the code. These products, which currently have a fifty
per cent differential under the GSA Appropriations Act,'5 should
not be affected by the code. The AFL-CIO also argues that state
and local governments' Buy American Acts should not be affected
" Buy American Act, Pub. L. No. 86-624, § 28, 74 Stat. 419 (1960).
" See generally 40 U.S.C. § 475 et seq.
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(since their modification is not strictly required by the code), nor
should purchases made under federal grants to the states and
localities.
E. The Customs Valuation Code
Unlike the narrow focus of the Government Procurement Code,
the Customs Valuation Code 6 would have broad application to all
goods imported into a signatory country. Its purpose is to estab-
lish more uniform methods of appraising imports for duty pur-
poses, thereby helping traders to more accurately predict the
amount of duty owed. Among other things, the methods of valua-
tion provided by the code will have the effect of doing away with
the American Selling Price (ASP) method of valuation, the reten-
tion of which affected unions support. 7
The code also provides appeal rights for those who wish to con-
test a valuation. However, the code does not protect the rights of
persons other than traders. Clearly such other groups as United
States workers and producers should have standing to appeal
decisions under the code.
Moreover, organized labor hopes that the United States will
adopt the Customs Valuation Code on a c.i.f. basis (the cost of get-
ting goods to the point of exportation, plus the cost of shipping
and insurance) and that this adoption will not be considered as a
new barrier to trade which will require concessions to other signa-
tories. Labor recommends this shift from an f.o.b. basis (which in-
cludes only the cost of getting goods to the point of exportation)
because the result would make American goods more competitive
with imports and would lessen the bias toward trade with more
distant countries that an f.o.b. basis of valuation fosters.
F. GATT Reform
The final major agreement now contained in the Tokyo Round
package of particular concern to labor is the Framework Agree-
ment on GATT reform.18 This agreement covers primarily four
areas: special treatment for LDCs; safeguard action for develop-
mental and balance of payments purposes; consultation, dispute
settlement and oversight; and export restrictions.
" See Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, at 153 supra.
"7 As the basis for this statement of the labor position, the author relied on the comments
of individual labor leaders.
Is See Graham, Results of the Tokyo Round, at 153 supra.
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Here, as in the Safeguards Code, organized labor sees the
special and more favorable treatment to be accorded to LDCs,
without a provision for "graduation" from that status, to be detri-
mental to the agreement. It is important, labor believes, for a
definition of the concept of graduation to be incorporated into the
United States enabling legislation.
The consultation, dispute settlement and surveillance pro-
cedure provisions of the framework agreement are essentially an
affirmation of existing GATT commitments. Perhaps the real im-
portance of the framework agreement is in its recognition that
reform of the international trading system is a continuing process.
III. CONCLUSION
Not only does labor see the necessity for further reform, but
also the necessity for clarification, through domestic implement-
ing legislation or otherwise, of the present Tokyo Round package.
The main concern is the relationship of the individual agreements
to each other and the practical application of the multiplicity of
dispute settlement or surveillance procedures contained in the
package. Clearly the agreements could have an impact on pre-
existing domestic laws and procedures. In this event, labor wants
to insure that the view of United States workers and industry will
receive adequate representation as the new procedures are ap-
plied. Most important to labor is obtaining some means by which
both American workers and industry can be assured that any
relief or remedy provided under the agreements will be delivered
to them in time. As Ray Dennison, the Associate Director of the
AFL-CIO Department of Legislation told the Senate Finance In-
ternational Trade subcommittee during hearings on these agree-
ments, "[i]f the procedures do not result in swift action, a great
many Americans will learn that a right delayed is no right at all."
Organized labor would like to be assured that the Tokyo Round
agreements will allow for growth and expansion of United States
industries and not just preservation of a status quo. In the final
analysis, labor believes that the development of an open, nondis-
criminatory and fair world economic system, in the spirit of the
Trade Act of 1974, must depend upon the competitive strength of
the individual participants.
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